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BOOK REVIEW
REVIEW OF NEW YORK CITY POLICE
CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION
COMMISSIONS, 1894-1994
(GABRIEL J. CHIN ED., 1997)
PAUL CHEVIGNY*
INTRODUCTION

The New York City Police Department ("NYPD") is one of
the most discussed police departments in the world. At the present
time, for example, its ambassadors, including former commissioner
William Bratton, are deployed over the globe, explaining "quality
of life policing," and why they believe it works. It is successful, per
haps, because it resembles one of the oldest versions of policing,
from which the word "police" itself derives: officials maintain an air
of omniscience and a sense of order by pursuing every infraction
and tolerating no deviation. Inspector Javert, in Victor Hugo's Les
Miserables, is the ideal of "zero tolerance" policing.
Despite the fame and occasional notoriety of the NYPD, there
is no serious and systematic work recounting its history.! The rela
tion of "quality of life policing," for example, to earlier practices in
New York City, as well as other cities, remains a matter of anecdote
and sporadic, although sometimes brilliant, journalism. In this re
spect, history is not very different for New York City than it is for
other cities. Until the last generation, police work in the United
States nearly passed under the academic radar. This was partly a
result of the fact that police in this country have mostly been organ
ized at the municipal level and have always dealt chiefly with the
poor. The history of the police was, until recently, viewed as local,

* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. LL.B., 1960, Harvard
University School of Law; B.A., 1957, Yale University.
1. The best written history on the early period is JAMES F. RICHARDSON, THE
NEW YORK POLICE: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1901 (1970). Conversely, GERALD ASTOR,
THE NEW YORK CoPs: AN INFORMAL HISTORY (1971), is exactly what it purports to be.
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repetitive, and low-class. 2
The material that we have for the history of the police in our
cities is largely the chronicles of misdeeds, either those curbed by
the police or those committed by the police themselves. Such
chronicles have been preserved in some memoirs, but more in
newspaper accounts either about celebrated crimes or municipal
scandals, which have led to official reports such as those collected
by Gabriel Chin in New York City Police Corruption Investigation
Commissions, 1894-1994.3 Yet these misdeeds have been a motor
of change in police departments, as well as in municipalities gener
ally. So, the reports that Chin has collected are a good part of the
skeleton of the history of the NYPD. In his introduction to the
volumes, Chin notes the weary saying of New Yorkers that for the
past century there has been a big police scandal "every twenty years
or SO."4 These six volumes constitute the final reports for the most
notable of those scandals, which actually occurred more frequently
than every twenty years.s The first report, in 1894, was a legislative
inquiry headed by State Senator Clarence Lexow, triggered by a
series of investigations by private reformers, with resulting newspa
per stories detailing vice and corruption in the city. The second, led
by city Alderman Henry Curran, was prompted by the 1912 murder
of gambler Herman Rosenthal, masterminded (or so it was thought
at the time) by NYPD Lieutenant Charles Becker. Seventeen years
later, Governor Franklin Roosevelt requested the judiciary to look
into corruption in the city's courts. Judge Samuel Seabury pub
lished the results of his investigation in 1932, when scandal about
corruption and brutality in law enforcement was rising nationally as
well. 6 In 1949, following a newspaper scandal about corrupt pay
2. An excellent study of Los Angeles city police, Joseph Gerald Woods, The
Progressives and the Police: Urban Reform and the Professionalization of the Los An
geles Police (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Los An
geles», has unfortunately never been published.
3. The series of reports collected by Professor Chin appear in a six volume work,
with each volume containing a specific report. In addition, Professor Chin has added a
brief introduction to each report, as well as a series introduction contained within vol
ume I. Each of the six volumes will be referred to within this Book Review by either
the name of its accompanying report or introduction. See generally 1 NEW YORK CITY
POLICE CORRUPTION INVESTIGATION COMMISSIONS, 1894-1994 (Gabriel J. Chin ed.
1997) [hereinafter SERIES INTRODUCTION or LEXOW REpORT]; 2 id. [hereinafter CUR.
RAN REPORT]; 3 id. [hereinafter SEABURY REpORT]; 4 id. [hereinafter HELFAND RE·
PORT]; 5 id. [hereinafter KNAPP REpORT]; 6 id. [hereinafter MOLLEN REpORT).
4. SERIES INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at ix.
5. As noted by Chin, there have also been other scandals and other reports. See
id. at viii-ix.
6. The first national report on abuses in law enforcement appeared in 1931 and
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ments from gamblers, Brooklyn prosecutor Julius Helfand under
took not only to report, but to prosecute the crimes. In 1972,
prompted again by newspaper stories of corruption, many of which
emanated from two police officers whose names have become leg
end, Frank Serpico and David Durk, a citizens' commission led by
Whitman Knapp, at the request of Mayor John Lindsay, reported
the results of its investigation. Finally, in 1994, after a spectacularly
embarrassing arrest of New York City police brazenly selling drugs
on Long Island, a commission requested by Mayor David Dinkins
and led by former judge Milton Mollen reported on corruption and
brutality in several city precincts. Despite the fact that Professor
Chin has edited these reports in six small volumes, reading them is
not an intimidating project; the longest report (Knapp) is 264 pages,
while the shortest (Curran) is 39 pages (without appendices).
I read the Knapp and Mollen Commission Reports when they
came out (so old am I in the pursuit of these scandals), and I looked
at some of the others in my own work. But I had no conception of
how interesting it would be to read them all in succession. Collec
tively, the reports give us an idea as to how political scandal and
reform are produced in our society. The press is the great engine
for creating pressure in these cases, forcing political leaders to take
some action, however minimal. In the case of most of these investi
gations, leaders had something to lose by undertaking them. Judge
Samuel Seabury, under the aegis of the governor and the appellate
courts, had the greatest freedom and the greatest results. Clarence
Lexow, a legislator, was opposed by the governor; it is illuminating
to read the 1894 message of the governor vetoing the budget for the
investigation, saying that it was "a misuse of public money ... for
the manufacture of political capital or the division of political pa
tronage."7 The legislators were obliged to raise funds from private
sources to complete the project. The report was such a bombshell
that no one has had the temerity to berate subsequent investiga
tions in such bold terms.
Yet, surely Mayor Lindsay (Knapp) and Mayor Dinkins (Mol
len) had reason to be apprehensive about the scandals in their ad
ministrations. They may have expressed their fears through budget
limitations; both the Knapp and Mollen Commissions had some pri
discussed such scandal. See generally

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE

AND ENFORCEMENT ("WICKERSHAM COMMISSION"), REpORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT

7.

(1931).

LEXOW REpORT,

supra note 3, at 10.
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vate support supplementing the public outlays. However reluctant
the mayors may have been, they had little choice but to authorize
the commissions. The storms of scandal were so overwhelming that
officials looked less guilty by joining the investigation than by fight
ing it. The mayors also were, no doubt, men of good faith; they
genuinely sought to understand the problem rather than avoid it.
They did not indulge in a cynical dodge, as Mayor Giuliani did after
the Louima torture scandal in 1997, appointing a powerless body
and then condemning its conc1usions. 8 All in all, the original publi
cation of these six reports is a great credit to a free press and parti
san politics.
Although their embodiment of the political dynamics that pro
duce scandal and reform would be enough to make these reports
interesting, in fact, they have broader significance. They are of his
torical significance in at least two ways. While it is true that some
of the problems, especially corruption due to "vice" crimes, are re
peated in the successive reports, they also record changes in New
York City, its politics, and its police. The reports suggest what the
social causes were and are that perpetuate the problems, as well as
the sources of change. These may be social-the shift to narcotics
as a source of corruption, for example-or they may be quite delib
erate-the instruments of institutional reform.
I.

ETERNAL CORRUPTION?

All of the investigations before the most recent Mollen Report
of 1994 reveal police corruption in enforcing laws against gambling
and prostitution. In 1972, the Knapp Commission noted corruption
in narcotics enforcement, and by 1994, narcotics graft had com
pletely overshadowed the others.9
Commentators on urban history in the United States have re
marked that the persistent corruption in the enforcement of "vice"
crimes is a reflection of the puritanism and hypocrisy that runs
through our law, particularly during periods of reform. 1O Legisla
8. See generally MICHAEL MEYERS ET AL., DEFLEcnNG BLAME: THE DISSENT
ING REpORT OF THE MAYOR's TASK FORCE ON POLICE/COMMUNITY RELATIONS
(1998).
9. Compare KNAPP REPORT, supra note 3, at 91-115 (briefly analyzing the prob
lem of police corruption in narcotics enforcement), with MOLLEN REPORT, supra note
3, at 16-17 (recognizing that the nature of police corruption has changed, with corrup
tion in narcotics enforcement now representing a significant portion of the corruption
problem).
10. See PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE: POLICE VIOLENCE IN THE AMERI
CAS 117-44 (1995); ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 108-111 (1977).
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tors could not vote against a law that condemned vice. However, in
practice few cared to control it, except perhaps in the case of nar
cotics, which presents more serious problems of control, as well as
greater monetary temptations. The result has been that purveyors
of vice have paid off officials for protection from the laws. As this
is written, in 1998, we are in the midst of a scandal, relatively minor
compared to the six in the volumes under review, in which New
York City police received sexual payoffs in return for protecting
brothels in midtown Manhattan.!1 Despite the hypocrisy and cor
ruption, vice laws have continued on the books. Reading these six
reports together with Professor Chin's introduction, it is difficult to
escape the sense that ambitious reformers needed the vice laws, and
the scandals they generated, to justify their work. Professor Chin
recites the list of investigators, prosecutors, and commissioners who
built their reputations through these six investigations, attaining ju
dicial posts and higher office. 12
Officials, not just in New York City, but in other cities, even
when they had no interest in reform, still needed the vice laws for
the corrupt revenue they produced. A Los Angeles politician, Wil
bur LeGette, long ago opined that "[t]he purpose of any political
organization is to get the money from the gamblers."13 It is inter
esting to note that as vice enforcement against gambling has faded,
the government has started to run its own lotteries. Corruption was
so general in New York City that the police took bribes from a wide
range of businesses outside the illegal vice rackets. Almost any
trade that was tightly regulated, as many were and still are in New
York City, was fair game for graft in return for overlooking minor
violations. The Knapp Commission reported that police were tak
ing payoffs from bars,14 and the Curran and Lexow Commissions,
much earlier, said that police took bribes to overlook evasion of
taxes on liquor.15 An interesting example is the tow-truck business,
a natural for graft because on most occasions when tow-trucks ar
rived at the scene of an accident, the police were already in control
of the situation. Since the business was highly competitive, there
was a strong temptation for tow-truck operators to payoff the po
11. Dan Barry, Police Used Brothel So Often, Madam Got Worried, N.Y.

TIMES,

July 18, 1991, at AI.

12. See SERIES INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at xiii-xvi.
13. Woods, supra note 2, at 315.
14. See KNAPP REpORT, supra note 3, at 2.
15. See CURRAN REPORT, supra note 3, at 15; LEXOW REpORT, supra note 3, at
19,39-40.
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lice for the privilege of being the first at the scene. Both the Hel
fand and Knapp Reports, nearly twenty years apart, record this
enduring racket. 16
The most interesting aspect of official graft in businesses that
were not condemned outright as forms of vice is that it had the
effect of drawing gangsters into the businesses. For example, years
ago, many night clubs in New York City had a reputation for being
run by "shady characters." This stemmed, in part, from the fact
that the night club business was so highly regulated that it was al
most impossible to run a club in a completely lawful manner. The
business thus attracted people who knew how to cut corners and
pay protection. 17 Police graft tended to turn legitimate businesses
into rackets.
Some of the sources of graft thinned out as the hypocrisy about
vice weakened over time. The Knapp Commission, in a move char
acteristic of the 1970s, recommended the legalization of gambling
and an end to Sabbath closing laws, which were an additional
source of payoffs. 18 The Knapp Report was also cautiously critical
of the way prostitution and narcotics laws were enforced. 19
Although gambling is now not strictly legal in New York, enforce
ment at the local level has largely disappeared. Corruption due to
drugs, however, has grown apace.
Any reader of these six reports must ask the question whether
the problem of corruption in the police is inevitable, and whether
the labor on the periodic reports, therefore, has been largely in vain
as an instrument of reform. The problem of tow-truck graft, after
all, was reported in investigations eighteen years apart. 20 Upon
analysis, these reports, for the most part, cannot answer that ques
tion because of the limitations in their conception of the problem.

II.

THE NARROW

Focus

OF THE REPORTS

Evidence of the distortion created by the methods used in
these reports can be found by looking at the connection between
corruption and brutality. In 1994, the Mollen Commission made a
16. See HELFAND REpORT, supra note 3, at 94-95; KNAPP REpORT, supra note 3,
at 158-62.
17. See generally PAUL CHEVIGNY, GIGS: JAZZ AND THE CABARET LAWS IN NEW
YORK CITY (1991).
18. See KNAPP REpORT, supra note 3, at 90, lSI.
19. See id. at 19.
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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point of describing the link between brutality and corruption;21 one
hundred years earlier, the Lexow Commission saw the connection
in "that the police formed a separate and highly privileged class,
armed with the authority and the machinery for oppression and
punishment, but practically free themselves from the operation of
the criminallaw."22 The implication is that both in the case of cor
ruption and of physical abuse, the police set themselves up as an
authority independent of the rest of the justice system, with the
powers to decide who shall be punished, in what way, and for what
offense. Moreover, when this extra-legal system is accepted by pa
trol officers and superiors, it creates a parallel system of impunity,
in which everyone is implicated, and no one can effectively report
unlawful acts. Thus, one problem feeds the other.
The four reports between the Lexow and Mollen Reports
missed the connection because they concentrated on "police cor
ruption" in a narrow sense, without its larger implications. Chief
Counsel Michael Armstrong implied as much in his foreword to the
Knapp Report. The reports may have failed to find better solutions
to the problem of "police corruption" because they focused too nar
rowly on the problem in isolation and because their proposals for
reform were thus restricted by that narrow focus, as well as by the
way the investigations were conducted.
Many of the reports limited their recommendations to reforms
within the police as a route to greater honesty, a course which has
not been fruitful.23 The Lexow Report, for example, recommended
that the direct management of the NYPD be removed from the par
tisan commission that was then nominally in control of it and, in
stead, be concentrated in the hands of a chief of police. 24
After executive power was actually centralized in a single com
missioner, eleven years later, the Curran Report blamed most of
the problems on poor management by the commissioner individu
ally and demanded that he be replaced (which was not done).25 By
this time, the defects in the oversight of police conducted by the
police themselves should have been tolerably clear. The Curran
Commission reported that complaints of corruption were simply re
ferred to the officer complained of for his comments; the commis
21. See MOLLEN REpORT, supra note 3, at 44-50.
22. LEXOW REpORT, supra note 3, at 31.
23. The Mollen Report, discussed infra this Part, is an exception, and the Seabury
Report, which is in a class by itself, is discussed infra Part III.
24. See LEXOW REpORT, supra note 3, at 59.
25. See CURRAN REpORT, supra note 3, at 3.
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sion recommended that "[a] small secret service squad, composed
of men other than policemen, should be employed by the Commis
sioner to secure evidence against corrupt police officials."26 In
eighty-five years, that recommendation has never been imple
mented. The Knapp Commission recommended that there be com
mand responsibility on the part of superiors for the actions of
officers and that the Internal Affairs Division, which investigates
corruption within the NYPD, be reorganized. 27 This was done, and
yet the Mollen Commission, twenty years later, reported very simi
lar problems in the internal investigations of corruption,28 which
was (and still is) viewed by superior officers as an embarrassing
problem that they would prefer not to think or talk about. Corrup
tion investigators get no thanks for doing a thorough job and senior
officers, when they cannot avoid the problem, tend to "solve" it by
making isolated arrests that may obstruct access to a larger network
of corruption.
Sometimes, the reports have recommended systematic changes
that are promising. The Knapp Commission advocated lateral en
try to the supervisory ranks,29 which would have tended to break
down the old-boy secrecy in the NYPD. This has never been done.
The Mollen Commission recommended the more basic reform of
using an outside investigative body to monitor police corruption in
the NYPD.30 The history of the recurring malaise in internal inves
tigations makes clear that this is a minimal reform, yet as of this
writing Mayor Giuliani has bitterly resisted any such proposals.
A further limitation on the effectiveness of the reports is that
most of them have focused on the punishment of individuals for
violating the laws against corruption. Such a punishment perspec
tive has often disabled the report from taking a larger view of re
form. Thus, the Knapp Commission wrote proudly of the numbers
of indictments that had issued from its work and offered as a princi
pal recommendation the appointment of a state special prosecutor
for corruption. 31 The worst offender in this respect is the Helfand
Report, which discussed nothing but scandal about gambling cor
ruption, and seemed to recommend almost nothing but more vigor
ous enforcement of the criminal laws, including the gambling
26.

[d. at 6.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See
See
See
See
See

supra note 3, at 13-16.
supra note 3, at 70-109.
KNAPP REPORT, supra note 3, at 32.
MOLLEN REpORT, supra note 3, at 148-58.
KNAPP REpORT, supra note 3, at 260-64.
KNAPP REpORT,

MOLLEN REpORT,
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laws. 32 While the prosecution of corrupt officials was necessary, of
course, it could not be the principal way of reducing police abuse,
which would have to come through institutional changes and re
duced temptations.
The concentration on the punishment of individuals has some
times effectively limited the focus of reports because the reports
cannot reach beyond those, few or many, against whom investiga
tors are able to obtain evidence. Thus, the Knapp Commission spe
cifically stated that it was "unable to develop hard evidence"
against anyone above the rank of lieutenant and that it had no re
sources to investigate officials outside the police department. 33
Similarly, the Mollen Commission was cautious in saying that its
mandate was limited to the police and that it could not determine
the full scope of corruption and brutality even inside the NYPD.34
While this caution is understandable within the framework of the
investigations-as we would not like to see these bodies make accu
sations against individuals without evidence-that framework has
created the impression that we are dealing with a problem that is
specific to the police, and perhaps especially to the rank-and-file.
Given the pervasiveness of corruption at the time of the Knapp in
vestigation, in retrospect, it seems unlikely that money was not be
ing paid, perhaps through the police, to other sorts of officials, and
it is very difficult to believe that high ranking police officials were
not involved. If there were no such wider connections, in the de
partment and the larger society, the persistence of massive corrup
tion would be nearly incomprehensible.
The punishment perspective, moreover, has led to side-effects
of doubtful desirability. Some individuals were scapegoated, as
Professor Chin points out in his introduction. 35 Resistance within
the NYPD to the scandal investigations was so intense that the
background of witnesses was commonly raked over until the police
and local prosecutors could find something with which to charge
someone in the effort to taint the investigation. There may be no
"frame-up;" the charge may be literally true, but of the sort that
would not have been discovered, or if discovered, would not have
been prosecuted without the investigation. Thus, witnesses for

32.
33.
34.
35.

See generally HELFAND REpORT, supra note 3.
See KNAPP REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
See MOLLEN REpORT, supra note 3, at 9.
See SERIES INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at xxiv.
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these reports have been charged with everything from perjury to
murder.
Both the Knapp and Mollen Commissions succeeded in their
investigations by turning officers against one another-by catching
an officer in a corrupt act and getting him to collect evidence in
return for leniency in prosecution. Although this practice is proba
bly unavoidable in the United States' system of prosecution, it is
certainly odious and it is not something that we should happily look
forward to as an instrument for controlling law enforcement abuses.
While such practices may have to be used in the short run and in
the individual case, the creation of suspicion and distrust cannot be
the best way to root out corruption. We look forward to a situation
where police officers not only do not expect to take graft, but where
society as a whole does not expect to take or offer graft as well.
This may seem a naive hope, but some of the experiences in these
investigations, notably in the Seabury Report, suggest that it is not
utterly utopian.
III. . SYSTEMIC CHANGE AND THE SIX INVESTIGATIONS

The Lexow Commission's proposal that the department be
managed by a single official was adopted, for better or for worse,
and still prevails today. At present, the police commissioner an
swers to the mayor, and the two systematically resist any intrusion
by other political forces.
A major change has been the minimization of outside political
interference in the appointment and promotion of police officers.
The Lexow and Curran Reports both criticized political interfer
ence and payoffs in personnel decisions, and the Lexow Commis
sion recommended a better civil service. 36 The Curran Report also
noted the poor pay of police officers and the poor quality of re
cruits.37 These are problems that have largely passed away; police
are recruited, protected, and decently paid through civil service
standards. The greatest change is one that affects much more than
the police and is, by this time, invisible to the average citizen, as
well as to the average lawyer: the transformation of the criminal
justice system, at its lower levels, from a racket to a system which,
whatever its defects, can at least be viewed and criticized as an at
tempt at a system of justice. Through all six of the reports there are
36. See
at 29-32.
37. See

LEXOW REpORT,

supra note 3, at 47-51;

CURRAN REpORT,

CURRAN REpORT,

supra note 3, at 23-29.

supra note 3,
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accounts of frame-ups or false charges. In later reports we read, for
example, of "flaking" people by planting narcotics to justify an
arrest 38 or using other devices to make a charge stick or to meet a
quota. 39 But in the earlier accounts, such practices amount to a sys
tem of oppression. The Lexow Commission reported that the po
lice brought charges against people, especially those least able to
defend themselves, solely for the purpose of extorting money in ex
change for having the charges dismissed. The commission charged
"the existence of a powerful conspiracy in the neighborhood of Es
sex Market police court (on the Lower East Side-PGC), headed by
politicians, including criminals, professional thieves, police and
others who lay plots against the unwary .... "40 This system, or one
like it, persisted for decades. The Curran Commission reported
that detectives staged crimes in order to shake down the victims for
the return of their goods, and that police witnesses could be in
duced to "throw a case" for a price. 41
The Seabury investigation addressed precisely the problem of
the lower criminal courts being run as an extortion racket by the
magistrates, lawyers, bondsmen, and police. Here is how the game
worked. An ordinary person was arrested for a low-level crime.
For example, a respectable woman was charged by the police vice
squad with prostitution. The police then refused to permit her to
make a telephone call until she made an arrangement with one of
their selected bail bondsmen. In return for most of her assets, the
bondsman got her released and offered to "fix" the case for her,
warning her that if she tried to defend the case any other way she
would be convicted. She was tried, defended by a lawyer she had
never seen before, and, if the fix was in, she was acquitted. Every
one was paid off, including the prosecutor. 42
Samuel Seabury, as a judge appointed by the judiciary at the
request of the governor, was not limited by local politics to looking
into "police corruption" or any other separate part of the problem;
he was supposed to solve the problem as a whole if he could. In his
report, Seabury discussed the police only in passing, along with
magistrates, lawyers, clerks, and bondsmen. Seabury did not rec
ommend any reforms in the police as such; he merely recom
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

supra note 3, at 28.
SERIES INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at xvii-xxi.
LEXOW REpORT, supra note 3, at 43.
See CURRAN REpORT, supra note 3, at 8, 16.
See SEABURY REpORT, supra note 3, at 21-24.

See
See

KNAPP REpORT,
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mended that arraignments never be held in station-houses. 43 He
recommended that the magistrates' court be abolished and replaced
by a centralized criminal court and that the bail system be reformed
to permit parole release for some defendants and cash bond release
for many others in non-serious cases. 44 He also recommended that
the assistance of the lawyers who "hang around the courtrooms"45
be replaced by Legal Aid and a panel of lawyers selected by the
appellate courts.46 All of these reforms were implemented, while at
the same time the old, slack type of district attorney was being re
placed by ambitious incorruptibles like Thomas Dewy and Frank
Hogan. 47 The result has been that criminal court as an extortion
racket has utterly disappeared and with it a large source of corrup
tion of all sorts, including police corruption. In the daily work of
the lower courts, with a few exceptions, no one expects graft, and
no one offers it-the utopia I mentioned a few pages back.
The Seabury investigation is an object lesson in institutional
reform. The best of blue-ribbon commissions cannot solve
problems unless they are given the power to solve them. Seabury
had a very broad mandate and the backing of the governor and the
appellate judiciary, none of whom were interested in preserving the
status quo in the criminal justice system. Other commissions have
not had such a broad mandate or such uncompromising support.
Investigations which concentrate on "police corruption" to the ex
clusion of other problems may expose some problems and may
bring some criminals to justice. However, the work is very likely to
be repeated, especially if the investigations concentrate on the sins
of individual police officers, and even more so if the investigations
are limited to exposing the sins of low-level police officers.
Viewed as an isolated problem, police corruption and its at
tendant abuses can perhaps best be controlled by an oversight body
independent of the police, as the Mollen Commission recom
mended. 48 But the history of these six investigations tells us that we
ought to stop looking at police corruption as an isolated problem
and see it as one that reaches to other officials and to the larger
society.
43.

See id. at 202.
See id. at 164, 182, 202.
Id. at 217.
46. See id. at 220-21.
47. See generally Lawrence Fleischer, Thomas E. Dewey and Earl Warren: The
Rise of the Twentieth-Century Urban Prosecutor, 28 CAL. W. L. REv. 1 (1991).
48. See MOLLEN REpORT, supra note 3, at 148-58.
44.
45.

